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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings.

Plaintiff Stilwyn, Inc. ("Stilwyn") appeals from the District Court, Fifth Judicial District,
Blaine County's ("District Court") decision on summary judgment that it is barred from bringing
tort claims against the Defendants by virtue of its participation as an intervenor in a prior action,
the Federal Case described herein. R., Vol. V, p. 1091-1102.
The operative complaint is Stilwyn's Second Amended complaint filed on March 20,
2012. Defendant Idaho First Bank ("IFB" or "Idaho First") answered the Second Amended
complaint. The facts underlying Stilwyn' s claims arising out of the chronology of filings,
representations, and rulings therein are not in dispute.
IFB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9, 2013 on the grounds that
Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. R. Vol. II, p. 381-83. On April 5,
2013, Defendant Robert A. Kantor and Defendants Rokan Corporation and Rokan Partners
joined IFB's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 427-29, 430-39. The Page Defendants then
filed their notice of joinder on April 9, 2013. Id. at 454-56.
Stilwyn opposed the motions for summary judgment, arguing that its claims were not
compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case and were not barred by application ofres judicata.
The Defendants filed reply memoranda. R., Vol. V, p.1047-72, 1073-80, 1081-87. The
District Court heard oral argument on June 18, 2013.
On this record, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 23, 2013. Id. at 1091-1102. The court applied
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the doctrine of res judicata, specifically, claim preclusion, to find that Stihvyn should have and
could have asserted all of its claims (counterclaims and third-party claims) in the Federal Case.
On September 12, 2013, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of all
Defendants and dismissed the case in its entirety. Id. at 1133-35. Stilwyn filed its Notice of
Appeal on September 17, 2013. Id. at 1136-41.
The Defendants all requested an award of attorney fees and costs under J.C. § § 12-121
and 12-123. R., Vol. V, p. 1112-24, 1142-1200, 1201-73, 1274-86. On December 2, 2013 (filed
December 26, 2013 ), the District Court entered its Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Costs
and Attorney's Fees. Id. at 1296-1304. In its discretion, the district court denied the Defendants'
motions for attorney fees, but granted an award of costs in the amount of $61.00 to the Page
Defendants and $58.00 to IFB. Id. at 1303.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in its

interpretation, construction, and application of I.R.C.P. 13(a), or in its conclusion that Stilwyn
was required to assert compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims in the Federal Case.
2.

The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in its

interpretation, construction, and application of the doctrine ofres judicata (claim preclusion) or
in its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's involvement in the
Federal Case.
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3.

The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in failing to

adopt and apply the declaratory judgment exception found in Restatement (Second) of
Judgments§ 33 to the facts of this case.
4.

The District Court erred in not granting Idaho First's motion for attorney fees

pursuant to LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
A. Attorney Fees on Appeal

Idaho First is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §12-121. For all the reasons
discussed in this submission, Stilwyn's continuing efforts to revive its claims in the face of the
effect of res judicata are made frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. See, e.g.,

Urrutia v. Harrison, 2014 Ida. LEXIS 192 (Idaho July 31, 2014) ("An overall view of the case
establishes that the appeal was pursued unreasonably" and attorney fees appropriate on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 ). Thus, Defendant Idaho First should be granted its attorney
fees, including those on appeal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

Factual Basis for Summary Judgment - Federal Case Chronology and
Proceedings
1. Introduction

In its "Introduction" to Appellant's Opening Brief ("App. Br."), Stilwyn deemed it
"necessary to set forth the genesis of and procedural history, decision, and judgment in the
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[Federal Case 1]. App.Br. I. Despite Stilwyn's characterizations, editorial comments and legal
conclusions, it provided a general summary of the chronology of the proceedings and certain
events between September 2009 and Judge Winrnill's February 13, 2011 Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order ("Fed.Ct. Order"). App.Br. 2-4; R.,Vol. II, p. 305-18.
During Stilwyn's fact recitation and later, Stilwyn attempted to minimize and downplay
its level of participation and role in the Federal Case. App.Br. 4 ("Given the limited nature of its
intervention, Stilwyn .... ") (emphasis added); Id. at 6 ("Stilwyn was not a signatory to the
Stipulation .... "); Id. at 11 (describing itself as "an intervenor who did not execute the
stipulation."); and, Id. at 31 (disclaiming its "involvement" as an intervenor in the Federal Case.)
2. The Portfolio Complaint and FDIC Counterclaim
Stilwyn also repeatedly sought to characterize the Federal Case solely as a declaratory
judgment action brought by then Plaintiffs, Anaconda Investments, LLC, and Portfolio FBIdaho, LLC ("Anaconda/Portfolio") against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"). App.Br. 3; R.,Vol. II, p. 518-19. When the FDIC removed Anaconda/Portfolio's state
court action to federal court the FDIC filed its Answer and Counterclaim against
Anaconda/Portfolio on August 11,2010. R., Vol. III, p. 566-585. In its Answer, the FDIC
admits:
•

Stilwyn's loan was secured by Blaine County property (R., Vol. III, p. 576-577, il 5),

Portfolio FB-Idaho, LLC v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 1: 10-cv-00377-BLW (D. Idaho June
28,2011).
1
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•

First Bank of Idaho ("FBI") held a participation interest in the loan, the FDIC was
appointed receiver for FBI (Id. at 577,, 6-7),

•

FDIC took control of FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan (Id. ,7),

•

Idaho First Bank ("IFB") submitted the highest bid for the Stilwyn loan but alleges it was
not the successful bidder because it violated the FDIC auction terms since there was a
"prearrangement for the purchase" and FDIC notified IFB it would not close on the sale
of FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan. (Id.

il 8).

The FDIC also pied seven affirmative defenses, including:
•

"unclean hands" (First Affirmative Defense),

•

"conduct of others" (Second Affirmative Defense),

•

Anaconda/Portfolio's fraud (Third Affirmative Defense),

•

Anaconda/Portfolio's bad faith (Fifth Affirmative Defense),

•

Failure of consideration (Sixth Affirmative Defense). Id. at 578.

In its Counterclaim against Anaconda/Portfolio, the FDIC made the following general
allegations:
•

FBI made a $9.5 million loan to Stilwyn the purpose of which was to construct five
homes in the Weyyakin Subdivision in Sun Valley, Idaho. Id. at 579,, 6.

•

Robert M. Smelick and Gail S. Smelick signed a promissory note and executed a deed of
trust on behalf of Stilwyn. Id. at 580, il 7.

•

The deed of trust was recorded in Blaine County on May 18, 2007). Id. at 580,, 8.
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•

FBI sold a 42% participation interest in the Stihvyn loan to Farmers National Bank, NA
and retained a 58% interest. Id. ,i 9.

•

FDIC was appointed receiver for FBI and took over FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan on
April 24, 2009. Id.

iJ 10.

•

The Stilwyn loan was included in an auction on September 29, 2009. Id. ,i 11.

•

The FDIC sale was a bank-only bidder sale and banks could not enter into negotiations or
make agreement with a non-bank before a sale of the assets closed. Id. ,i 12.

•

IFB submitted the highest bid for the Stilwyn loan interest. Id. ,i 13.

•

After the auction, IFB wired funds for closing the Stilwyn loan. Id. at 581, ,i 14.

•

The FDIC learned IFB entered into a prearranged purchase of the participation which
violated the auction rules. Id.

•

October 27, 2009, the FDIC notified IFB it would not close the sale of the Stilwyn loan
participation. Id.

•

il 15.

il 16.

November 16, 2009, the FDIC and IFB agreed the sale of the Stilwyn participation "was
never consummated". Id. ,i 17.

il 18.

•

November 16, 2009, all funds were returned to IFB. Id.

•

February 17, 2010, an Assignment and Assumption of Interest and Obligations between
Anaconda and Portfolio ("Assignment") was recorded in Blaine County by Anaconda
against the Stilwyn property. Id. ,i 19.
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•

In the Assignment, Anaconda and Portfolio allege the FDIC transferred the Stilwyn
participation to IFB on October 22, 2009 and then IFB transferred that interest to
Anaconda. Id., 20.

•

On May 10, 2010, the FDIC demanded Anaconda/Portfolio release the Assignment and
Anaconda/Portfolio did not comply. Id.

•

il 21.

July 15, 2010, Anaconda/Portfolio recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against the Stilwyn
property in Blaine County. Id. at 582, il 22.

The FDIC's First Cause of Action against Anaconda/Portfolio on its counterclaim was for
slander of title. In that Cause, the FDIC alleged:
•

"By recording the Assignment, Anaconda and Portfolio have uttered and published
slanderous words regarding its rights in relation to the [Stilwyn] Real Property." Id., 24.

•

Anaconda/Portfolio knew the sale of the Stilwyn participation was not closed and they
had no interest in the Stilwyn real prope1iy. Id.

•

Anaconda/Portfolio acted maliciously in trying to cloud the interest in the Stilwyn real
property. Id.

•

il 25.

il 26.

The cloud on title to the Stilwyn real property created by filing the Assignment and
Notice of Lis Pendens "inhibited" the FDIC's ability to sell the Stilwyn loan
participation. Id., 27.

•

The FDIC was damaged by recording the Assignment and the refusal to remove it from
title records. Id., 28.
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3. Case Management Order
Judge Winmill entered a Case Management Order ("Management Order") in the Federal
Case on October 19, 2010. Case Management Order, supra note 1, Oct. 19, 2010, ECF No. 15. 2
In the Management Order, the Court set January 14, 2011 as the deadline for"[ a]11 motions to
amend pleadings and join parties .... [because] [a]ll parties are entitled to know the claims and
parties well-before trial rather than be forced to pursue or defend against a moving target." Id. at
2.

4. FDIC Counterclaim - Slander Title
The FDIC's counterclaim significantly deepened the waters into which Stilwyn
intentionally dove when, "[ o]n the eve of the hearings on the cross-motions [for summary
judgment], Stilwyn sought to intervene to file briefing in support of the FDIC's opposition to the
Anaconda/Portfolio motion." App.Br. 4. When Stilwyn intervened as a Defendant on December
3, 2010, the FDIC's tort counterclaim had expanded the scope and focus of the Federal Case.
The FDIC claimed it was damaged. R., Vol. III, p. 582, ,r 28. The FDIC's counterclaim
allegations form the core fact pattern Stilwyn relied on during the remaining iterations of this
litigation.
5. Summary Judgment Motions
Two motions for summary judgment were pending when Stilwyn moved to intervene on
December 3, 2010. R., Vol. III, p. 704. Plaintiffs Anaconda/Portfolio moved for Summary
Judgment with accompanying documentation on September 9, 2010 (Anaconda/Portfolio MSJ'').

2

Inclusion of this Order in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment.
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Id. at 591-617. In its motion for summary judgment, Anaconda/Portfolio requested the Court
declare Portfolio to be "the legal owner of First Bank ofldaho's interest in the Stilwyn Inc. loan
including but not limited to the security interests related to said loan." Id at 592. Defendant,
FDIC filed its Memorandum of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for First
Bank in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("FDIC Opp. Memo.") with
supporting affidavits on October 4,2010. R., Vol. III, p. 618-641. The FDIC argued (1) the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs' claims; (Id. at 624-626) (2) lack of
privity of contract between Plaintiffs and the FDIC, (Id. at 626-627) and, (3) any contract
between the FDIC and IFB had been rescinded (Id. at 627-628).
Next, the FDIC filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 3 on October 21, 2010. Id.
at 642-662. It argued "recording of the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens was without
authorization of the FDIC-Rand clouds the FDIC-R's property interest in the real property" and
requested "an order directing the Plaintiffs to release the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens."

Id. at 646. The hearing on the summary judgment motions was scheduled for December 9, 2010.
Id. at 672. But, it was vacated pending Stilwyn's Motion to Intervene. Id.
6. Stilwyn's Motion to Intervene

The Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn, Inc. ("Motion to Intervene")(R., Vol.
III, p. 673-685), Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn, Inc.
("Intervene Memo. ")(Id. at 686-706), and the Declaration of Robert M. Smelick in Support of
The FDIC's summary judgment motion requested "an order directing the Plaintiffs to release
the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens." It did not ask for summary judgment on its
counterclaim for slander of title. R., Vol. III, p. 646.
3
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Stilwyn, Inc.'s Motion to Intervene as a Defendant ("Smelick Dec.")(/d. at 707-716) demonstrate
that Stilwyn keenly knew of the detailed facts of the FDIC auction and the subsequent events
created by Anaconda/Portfolio. Stilwyn moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) as a
matter of right and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), permissive intervention. Id. at 673. In the body
of the Motion to Intervene, Stilwyn represented to the Com1 that:
Stilwyn has an agreement with Farmers National Bank to restructure the Stilwyn
Loan, provided Farmers is able to purchase the FDIC's interest in the loan. The
plaintiffs claim they hold the FDIC's interest in the Stilwyn loan and have filed a
lis pendens on the property. Plaintiffs have thus placed a cloud on the property
and prevented Stilwyn from pursuing its agreement with Farmers.
Stilwyn thus has significant protectable interests related to the subject matter of
the litigation, and, as both a legal and practical matter, its interests in the loan and
the real property will be directly affected by the outcome of the litigation. If the
plaintiffs were to succeed, Stilwyn faces, among other things, the loss of its
property rights; the loss of its opportunity to restructure the loan and market the
houses already constructed with the proceeds of the loan; and loss of the right to
pay off the loan and develop the remaining 14 buildable lots on the property.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 674.
In its Intervene Memo, Stilwyn asserted that "[i]n perhaps the most practical sense
imaginable, Stilwyn's ability to protect its property rights, its investment, and its pursuit of the
opportunity to finalize the restructure of its loan will be "disadvantaged" if the Plaintiffs are
granted the relief they want." Id. at 701.
Stilwyn's president, Robert M. Smelick's ("Smelick"), testimony to support the Motion
to Intervene declared:

ill 9 "By the mid-summer of 2010, Stilwyn had reached an agreement with
Farmers to restructure its loan. Farmers had, in turn, reached an agreement with
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the FDIC by which it would acquire the FDIC's interest in the Stilwyn loan.
However, these agreements are contingent upon the cloud on the title to the
property resulting from the actions taken by Portfolio-FE and Anaconda, the
plaintiffs in this case, being removed."
ir20 "I decided that Stilwyn must seek to intervene as a party in this litigation in
order to protect its interests and property rights in the Weyyakin property. Time is
of the essence, and Stilwyn needs this litigation resolved expeditiously so that it
may finalize the restructure of its loan with Farmers and pursue the marketing of
the houses to make payments on that loan."

Id. at 711-712.
Stilwyn continued to assert its "direct, practical, and legal interest in the outcome of [the
Federal Case]". Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn,
Inc., supra note 1, Dec. 15, 2010, ECF No. 26. 4 "Stilwyn has significant protcctable interests in
the subject matter of this litigation and that, as both a legal and practical matter, the preservation
of Stilwyn's property rights, contract rights, and economic survival depend on the outcome of the
litigation." Id. at 1.
Judge Winmill granted Stilwyn's motion to intervene on December 17,2010,
Memorandum Decision and Order on Stilwyn, Inc. 's Motion to Intervene ("Intervention
Decision"). R., Vol. III, p. 725-734. The Court there found that "Stilwyn has shown significant
protectable interests relating to the loan and the encumbered property that is the subject of this
action." Id. at 729.
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7. Stilwyn's Opposition to Summary Judgment
On December 27, 2010, Stilwyn filed Defendant Intervenor Stilwyn, Inc. 's Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Stilwyn MSJ Opp. Memo."), Id. at
735-755; Stilwyn, Inc.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Stilwyn's MSJ Undisputed Facts"), Id. at 756-768; the Declaration of
Mike Hamilton [in opposition to motion for summary judgment] ("Hamilton Dec."), Id. at 769773; and, the Declaration of B. Newal Squyres [in opposition to motion for summary judgment]
("Squyres' Dec.") to which were attached Exhibits A through H, supra note 1, Dec. 23, 2010.
ECF No. 30-3. 5
Stilwyn's MSJ Opposition Memorandum and the related filings demonstrate that as of
December 27,2010, Stilwyn had intimate and detailed knowledge of all aspects of the
September-October 2009 FDIC loan auction and the subsequent steps taken by Anaconda/
Portfolio to claim ownership in the Stilwyn Loan. R., Vol. III, pp. 737-741; 758-767.
In opposing Anaconda/Portfolio's summary judgment motion, Stilwyn argued:
•

There was no transfer of the Stil wyn Loan from the FDIC to IFB therefore IFB could

not transfer whatever interest IFB may have had to Anaconda. Id. at 743-746.
•

Any agreements between IFB and Anaconda were void and unenforceable. Id. at

746-750.

5
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•

Anaconda/Portfolio were not in privity of contract with the FDIC therefore the FDIC

had no contractual duty to deliver the Stilwyn Loan to IFB or Anaconda/Portfolio. Id. at
750-751.
•

Anaconda/Portfolio as assignees of IFB's interest in the Stilwyn Loan took no greater

interest than IFB and are subject to the same defenses the FDIC could assert against IFB.
Id. at 751-752.
•

Anaconda/Portfolio were not holders in and were subject to the FDIC's claim of

ownership under Idaho Code § 28-3-306. Id. at 752-753.
•

The FD IC had no duty to transfer the Stilwyn Loan because of IFB' s breach of a

condition precedent. Id. at 753-754.
Stilwyn summarized its opposition to Anaconda/Portfolio's summary judgment by
concluding Plaintiffs could not establish any rights in the Stilwyn Loan and requested the Court
to " ... order Plaintiffs to remove all clouds on the title to the Real Property created by Plaintiffs,
including the Portfolio Assignment recorded on February 17, 2010 as Instrument No. 575198,
and the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded on July 15, 2010 as Instrument No. 579070." Id. at 754.
The depth of Stilwyn's factual knowledge of the Federal case within ten days of its
intervention is illustrated by its detailed statement of undisputed facts used to support the
opposition to the summary judgment motion. R., Vol. III, p. 756-768. In that filing Stilwyn
presented a thoughtful, well-organized recitation of the events culminating in the filing of the
Federal Case. Stilwyn, drawing from several sources, explained:
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•

"The Factual Background for the Stilwyn Loan Leading to the FDIC's Bank-Only

Auction" Id. at 758-759,
•

,r~ 1-7.

"The FDIC Established Strict Conditions and Requirements for Eligibility to Bid in

the Bank-Only Auction" Id. at 759-762,
•

~~

8-18.

"Idaho First Bank Decides to Submit a Bid for the Stilwyn Loan and Certifies its

Compliance with the Requirements for Eligibility to Bid and Purchase the Loan" Id. at
762,
•

~,r 19-22.

"Anaconda is Formed and IFB then Agrees to Assign it Interest in the Stilwyn Loan,

Thus Violating the Rules of the Auction" Id. at 762-764,
•

~~

23-33.

"Based on IFB's Violation of the Bid Requirements, the FDIC Refused to Close on

the Sale of the Stilwyn Loan and Agreed with IFB to Rescind the Transaction" Id. at 765,
~~

•

34-36.
"IFB Assigns its Interest in the Stilwyn Loan After Acknowledging Its Violation of

the Bid Documents, Demanding the Return oflts Consideration and Despite Knowing the
FDIC Considered it to Have Breached the Conditions of the Bid Documents" Id. at 765767,
•

~~

37-44.

"Over Three Months Later, Anaconda Assigned its Alleged Interest in the Stilwyn

Loan to Portfolio" Id. at 767, ~~45-46.
As additional factual support for its opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio summary
judgment motion, Stilwyn filed the Declaration of Mike Hamilton ("Hamilton Dec."), Id. at 769773.

Hamilton testified as the President of The Farmers National Bank of Buhl, Idaho about
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his bank's participation in the Stilwyn Loan; the nature of a bank-only auction and his interaction
with Anaconda. Id. at 769-772,

ri: 1, 2-8, 9-15.

Stilwyn's final submission in opposition to Plaintiff's summary judgment was counsel's
declaration to which was attached Exhibits A through H. Declaration of B. Newal Squyres,
supra note 1, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 30-3. The attached exhibits provide documentary
evidence of the nature of the various entities Stilwyn refers to in its opposition briefing.
8. Stilwyn's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Anaconda/Portfolio's
Complaint

December 27, 2010, Stilwyn filed its "Answer to Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment by Stilwyn, Inc." ("Stilwyn Answer"). R., Vol. III, p. 774-782. Besides
admitting and denying Anaconda/Portfolio's allegations and claims, Stilwyn pled seventeen
"Affirmative Defenses." Id. at 778-780. While most of the affirmative defenses parallel the
same arguments Stilwyn made in opposition to the summary judgment motion, several were a
preview of the claims Stilwyn makes in the present case. Affirmative defense number 11 alleges
"Plaintiffs are guilty of bad faith in connection with the events alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint."
Id. at 780,

~

11. Compare this to the more fully detailed version of Stilwyn's "Second Claim for

Relief (Abuse of Process) alleged in its Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") filed in Blaine
County (R., Vol. I, p. 70-96) where Stilwyn alleged in part:
111. Anaconda Investments was organized and used in pai1 by Kantor and Page
for the improper purpose of asserting unlawful and illegitimate ownership
interests in the Stilwyn Loan.
112. Portfolio FB-Idaho was organized and used for the improper purpose of
asserting unlawful and illegitimate ownership interests in the Stilwyn Loan.
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113. The improper purpose of using these legal entities was to create a legal
document (the Assignment) to be recorded in Blaine County to cloud title to the
Stilwyn property.
114. On or about July 8, 2010, Anaconda Investments and Portfolio FB-Idaho
filed a Declaratory Judgment complaint in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District, Blaine County asserting ownership rights in the Stilwyn Loan.
115. Defendants had an ulterior, improper purpose in organizing Anaconda and
Portfolio and in filing the Declaratory Judgment complaint.

Id. at 87-88,
at 90-91,

~~

~ii 111-115; See also,

Fifth Claim for Relief (Disregard of Corporate Identity), Id.

139-148; and, Ninth Claim for Relief (Spoliation), Id. at 93-94, ~~ 166-174.

Stilwyn alleged in affirmative defense number 13, of the Stilwyn Answer,
Anaconda/Portfolio's "damages, if any, were caused by superseding and intervening acts and/or
negligence of other parties over whom Defendant had not control and for whose actions
Defendant is not liable." R., Vol. III, p. 780. In its Second Amended Complaint, "Seventh
Claim for Relief (Aiding/ Abetting - Acting in Concert)," Stilwyn alleged:
156. Some or all of the Defendants helped plan, participated in, encouraged and
agreed to assist in violating the FDIC "bank-only" rules, violated Plaintiffs rights
or intentionally acted with each other (and with other individuals) to deprive
Plaintiff of its rights and interest in the Stilwyn Loan and related real property and
benefitted by facilitating a non-bank to bid on and attempt to purchase the 58%
interest in the Stilwyn Loan.
157. Defendants, including some or all of the individual Defendants, acted with
other to slander title to, to intentionally interfere with prospective economic
advantage, to abuse process, and to defame.
158. Defendants, including some or all of the individual Defendants, acted with
each other to facilitate an unlawful objective in an unlawful manner by violating
the "bank-only" rules.
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R., Vol. I, p. 92, ,r,r 156-158.
While the allegations in this claim are vague and non-specific, they implicated an
interaction among various parties intending to cause Stilwyn harm. In light of Stilwyn's detailed
factual due diligence, it is difficult to imagine it did not have some notion of who these "other
parties" were. This is especially so in light of the extensive enumeration and the detailed
descriptions of the additional defendants Stilwyn names in the three iterations of its Complaint
filed in this case. R., Vol. I, p. 19-23, ,rif 5-26; Id. at 46-49,

,r,r 5-23; and, Id. at 71-75, ,r,r 5-21.

In affirmative defense number 14, Stilwyn Answer, Stilwyn alleges Anaconda/Portfolio
"committed fraud." R., Vol. III, p. 780, ,r 14. This is the same allegation Stilwyn raised as a
claim in its Second Amended Complaint, i.e., "Sixth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Transfer). R.,
Vol. I, p. 91-92, ,r,r 149-153. The Sixth Claim is more specific than the affirmative defense,
relying on Idaho Code§ 55-913(1) as a basis for its fraud claim. Nevertheless, Stilwyn's
allegation in its claim is that Anaconda committed a fraud. Id. at 92, ,r 151.
Stilwyn's Fifteenth affirmative defense alleges that Anaconda knew about the bank-only
auction rule "and sought to circumvent the rule by colluding with IFB." R., Vol. III, p. 780, ,r15_
When Stilwyn moved to intervene in the Federal Case, it had a firm grasp on the events
surrounding the FDIC auction. Id. at 691-697. Stihvyn explained in detail the steps leading up
to the auction, how the auction was conducted, and post-auction events. Id. It also knowledgably
discussed and argued the arcane intricacies of the bank auction process. Id.
Stilwyn also alleged that Anaconda/Portfolio had "failed to include an indispensable
party" as its sixteenth affirmative defense. Id. at 780,
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,r16.

While not disclosing to which party it

was referring, it is highly likely the only non-Anaconda/Portfolio party with any potential role in
the events leading up to the Federal Case would have been Idaho First. IFB was well-known to
Stilwyn at the time of its intervention and it knew ofIFB's role in the FDIC auction. id. at 691697.
9. Deadline to Amend Pleadings Expired January 14, 2011

Under the Federal Case's Case Management Order, January 14, 2011, was the deadline
for "[a]ll motions to amend pleadings and join parties." Case Management Order, at 2.
10. Stilwyn's Joinder in FDIC Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

January 20, 2011, Stilwyn filed "Stilwyn's Joinder in Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment" in which it joined the "FDIC-R in seeking an Order from this Court
declaring that Plaintiffs have no right or interest in the Stilwyn Loan and requiring Plaintiffs to
remove all clouds on the title to the Real Property created by Plaintiffs, including the Portfolio
Assignment and Lis Pendens." R., Vol. III, p. 783-784.
Oral argument on the summary judgment motions was held on January 25, 2011. The
Court took the matter under advisement. Id. at 786.
January 26, 2011, the day after the summary judgment oral argument, Anaconda/
Portfolio filed a Motion to Supplement the Record with Additional Written Argument ("Motion
to Supplement") in which Anaconda/Portfolio argued there was additional evidence that the
FDIC had sold the Stilwyn Loan to IFB. Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with
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Additional Written Argument, supra note 1, Jan. 26, 2011, ECF No. 37. 6 The Court granted the
Motion to Supplement on January 27, 2011. R., Vol. III, p. 550.
11. Federal Court Order on Summary Judgment Motions

On February 1, 2011, the FDIC and Stilwyn each filed Responses to the Motion to
Supplement. See Brief of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for First Bank of
Idaho in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with Additional Written
Argument, supra note 1, Feb. 1, 2011, ECF No. 39 and Stilwyn's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion
to Supplement the Record with Additional Written Argument ("Stilwyn's Response to Motion to
Supplement"), Feb. 1, 2011, ECF No. 40. 7 In Stilwyn's Response to Motion to Supplement, it
carefully explained and argued to the Court why the sale of the Stilwyn Loan from the FDIC to
IFB was a failed transaction. It had failed to close because "the FDIC and IFB never completed

or fully executed all of the documents, no transfer of the Stilwyn Note ever occurred, and the
parties themselves, through their actions and communications, manifested an intention not to
close." Stilwyn's Response to Motion to Supplement, at 3. Following Stilwyn's summary of its
arguments, it detailed the facts underlying its arguments and the supporting legal authorities. Id.
at 1-8.
February 13, 2011, Judge Winmill issued a Memoranduni. Decision and Order denying
Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for summary judgment and granting the FDIC/Stilwyn motion for

6
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partial summary judgment. R., Vol. III, p. 787-790; R., Vol. IV, p. 791-800. The Court found
"the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens was improper." R., Vol. IV, p. 799.
A five-day trial on the remaining issues was set for July 11, 2011. Id. at 829-834.
12. FDIC Motion to Enforce Ruling
Despite the Court's rulings on the summary judgment motions, Anaconda/Portfolio
refused to release the Portfolio Assignment. In response, on April 4, 2011, the FDIC moved to
enforce the Court's earlier order, Defendant's Motion to Enforce Memorandum Decision and
Order ("FDIC's Motion to Enforce"). Id. at 835-838. Anaconda/Portfolio filed its Opposition to
the FDIC's Motion to Enforce on April 28, 2011, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Enforce Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 51) ("Anaconda/Portfolio Opposition").
Id. at 839-846. Stilwyn filed its reply to Anaconda/Portfolio's Opposition on May 5, 2011.

Intervenor Stilwyn, Inc.'s Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to the FDIC's Motion to Enforce
Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 51 )("Stilwyn Reply to Opposition"), supra note 1, May
16, 2011, ECF No. 56. 8
In Stilwyn's Reply to Opposition, Stilwyn summarized the procedural posture of the case
and correctly stated that "[t]he only claim remaining in the case after the Court's Summary
Judgment Decision is the counterclaim for slander of title now being pursued by Stilwyn and the
FDIC, which is set for a court trial beginning July 11." Stilwyn Reply to Opposition, at 2. It
argued that Anaconda/Portfolio had no factual support to assert that the FDIC had waived the
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auction rules and that recently discovered documents did not create new evidence sufficient to
alter the Court's order on summary judgment.
The Court granted the FDIC's Motion to Enforce on May 29, 2011, and ordered that
"Plaintiffs shall release the Portfolio Assignment within 5 business days of the date of this
order." R., Vol. IV, p. 850 (Emphasis in original).
13. Stilwyn Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of Title
Counterclaim

May 31, 2011, Stilwyn filed "Stilwyn, Inc.' s Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to
Slander of Title Counterclaim" ("Motion to Confirm"). R., Vol. IV, p. 851-853. It also filed
"Stilwyn Inc.' s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of
Title Counterclaim" ("Memo to Confirm Status"). R., Vol. II, p. 324-329. The Motion to
Confirm was supported by a "Declaration ofB. Newal Squyres." Declaration of B. Newal
Squyres ("Squyres Dec."), Exhibits 1 to 4, supra note 1, May 31, 2011, ECF No. 58-2. 9
Stilwyn's stated purpose in filing its Motion to Confirm was "to confirm its status as a
party counterclaimant with respect to the pending counterclaim for slander of title and for all
purposes of this litigation." R., Vol. IV, p. 851. Stilwyn summarized its participation in the
Federal Case from the time it intervened as follows:
Since its intervention, Stilwyn has filed briefs and supporting papers in opposition
to Plaintiffs pre-trial motions, filed briefs in support of FDIC-R's motions, filed
briefs and supporting papers in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the
Court's summary judgment decision, and in support of the FDIC's motion to
enforce. After the Court's summary judgment decision, Stilwyn has actively
pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title claim, including

9
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participation in the status conference regarding that claim and setting a trial date,
serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, noticing and taking
depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 11, 2011.
Id. at 852.
In its Memorandum to Confirm Status, Stilwyn argued that since the Court's "Summary
Judgment Decision, Stilwyn has taken the lead in actively pursuing the [FDIC's] counterclaim
[for slander of title]." R., Vol. II, p. 325. It explained that after propounding written discovery,
it "noticed and took the depositions of Robert Kantor, Richard Coleman, Anthony St. George,
and David Wali, all of whom were directly involved in the events related to the slander of title
claim." Id. To support its argument to confirm status, Stilwyn detailed in sixteen numbered
paragraphs, the steps it had taken to assert "its right to establish liability and damages with
respect to the slander of title claim ..... " Id. at 325-328. Additional evidence of its full
participation in the slander of title claim, Stilwyn' s counsel submitted, in entirety, its written
discovery and deposition notices. Squyres Dec., at 1-2; Ex. 1-4.
Anaconda/Portfolio filed its opposition to Stilwyn's Motion to Confirm on June 8, 2011,
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Stilwyn, Inc.' s Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of Title
Counterclaim (Dkt. No. 58) ("Opposition to Confirm Status"). R., Vol. IV, p. 859-866.
Plaintiffs argued in opposition that Stilwyn had never given Plaintiffs notice that "Stilwyn
intended to take any action in [the] lawsuit other than simply defending against Plaintiffs'
claims" and, as a result, Plaintiffs were "severely prejudiced" in their trial preparation. Id. at
860. Stilwyn fully" ... recognized the existence of the FDIC's counterclaim, Stilwyn
nevertheless chose for strategic or other reasons not to join in the FDIC's counterclaim or to
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personally assert a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs." Id. at 861. Plaintiffs claimed that
Stilwyn violated the Court's Case Management Order by failing to amend its Answer to plead a
counterclaim for slander of title before the expiration of the January 14, 2011, deadline; that Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15 does not permit verbal notice for amending claims; and, Stilwyn's damages for
slander of title differed from the FDIC's damages. Id. at 862-865. Alternatively, Anaconda/
Portfolio requested that the trial be continued. Id. at 865.
14. Stilwyn Withdrew Motion to Confirm Status to Pursue Remedies in
"Another Forum"
Stilwyn got caught. Several days later, June 13, 2011, Stilwyn filed its Notice of
Withdrawal of Stilwyn, Inc. 's Motion to Confirm Status ("Withdrawal Notice"). R., Vol. IV, p.
867-869. In its Withdrawal Notice, Stilwyn withdrew its Motion to Confim1 Status and declared
that it
... will pursue its remedies in another forum to avoid issues regarding its claims,
the parties that are potentially liable for the damages it has incurred based on such
claims, and its ability to collect such damages as may be awarded.
Therefore, Stilwyn does not intend to participate further in this case related to the
slander of title counterclaim but will continue to protect and defend its interests
related to Plaintiffs' claims that were subject to this Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order (Dkt. 41 ).

Id. at 867-868.
Stilwyn decided to just quit. Despite having fully participated in pursuing the slander of
title claim, it abdicated any further responsibility for the tort claim it had so actively pursued.
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Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC settled and dismissed the FD IC's slander of title claim.
R., Vol. IV, pp. 882-885. The Court entered an Amended Judgment on June 28, 2011. Id. at
889-890.
15. Stilwyn Filed Blaine County Complaint

Making good on its stated intent to "pursue its remedies in another forum," on September
28, 2011, Stilwyn filed its Complaint in Blaine County, Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 17-43. On March
20, 2012, Stilwyn filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 70-96.
16. Idaho First Bank filed Motion for Summary Judgment

March 11, 2013, IFB filed "Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment" ("IFB
MSJ")(R., Vol. II, p. 381-383), its "Memorandum in Support ofldaho First Bank's Motion for
Summary Judgment" ("IFB Memo re MSJ")(/d. at 394-422), "Idaho First Bank's Statement of
Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion of Motion for Summary Judgment" ("IFB SOF")(/d. at
384-393) and "Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams Re: Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and I.R.E. 201 Motion" ("Williams Aff.") with Exhibits A through V attached. R.,
Vol. I, p. 141-261; R., Vol. II, p. 262-370. Exhibits A through S were selected copies of various
pleadings and other filings from the Federal Case. The District Court was well-apprised of the
procedural posture of the Federal Case.
Idaho First's summary judgment motion to dismiss Stilwyn's claims was based on three
broad arguments: (1) Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion (R., Vol.
II, p. 396-409); (2) Stilwyn failed to plead Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaims in the
Federal Case and therefore lost the right to bring them in the state case (Id. at 409-41 O); and, (3)
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Stilwyn could not prove facts to support prima facie cases against IFB for slander of title,
intentional interference with prospective advantage, abuse of process, defamation, "acting in
concert," spoliation, and/or estoppel (Id. at 410-420).
To support IFB's argument that Stilwyn's claims against IFB were barred by the doctrine
ofres judicata, IFB proved all elements of that doctrine; same pai1ies, same claims and final
judgment as required by the Idaho Supreme Court in Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,
157 P.3d 613 (2007). R., Vol. II, p. 398-407. IFB demonstrated that because of the corporate/
entity interrelatedness of the named defendants in both the Federal Case and the state case, the
parties were the same or in privity with each other. Id. at 398-401. Stilwyn's claims in the
Federal Case and the state case were the same, IFB argued, because they arose out of the same
operative transactional facts and Stilwyn, in both cases was attempting to preserve its property
rights and economic survival. Id. at 401-405. Finally, IFB proved the third and final prong of
the claim preclusion doctrine - the Federal Court entered a final judgment in the Federal Case
dismissing all claims with prejudice. Id. at 405-407.

17. Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment Granted - Stilwyn's
Claims Dismissed
July 23, 2013, Judge Brody filed his "Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants
Motion of Summary Judgment" ("MSJ Decision"). R., Vol. V, p. 1091-1102. The District Court
held that Stilwyn's claims were barred by resjudicata, specifically claim preclusion because
" ... the claims should have been brought in the Federal Case where Stilwyn voluntarily subjected
itself to the jurisdictional powers of the U.S. District Court for the District ofidaho as an
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intervener, could have asserted the counterclaim, and did attempt to join the counterclaim with
the FDIC." Id. at 1095. The Court followed Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 ldahol 19, 123, 157
P.3d 613,617 (2007) and applied the three-prong test for application of the resjudicata doctrine;
same parties, same claims and final judgment. R., Vol. V, p. 1095-1101. The Court found "no
genuine issue as to any material fact exists and Stilwyn meets those requirements, requiring
dismissal of the complaint." Id. at 1096. The Court, in its analysis first found that Stilwyn was a
party to the case due to its Motion to Intervene. Id. at 1096-1097; see also R., Vol. III, p. 673676; R., Vol. III, p. 725-734. Stilwyn is a party since it is a "party as of right" in the Federal
Case. R., Vol. V, p. 1097. The District Court held that the parties in the Federal Case are the
same as the District Court case. Id. The link was Robert Kantor and Michael Page, as Stilwyn
alleged in its Second Amended Complaint. Id.
Second, the District Court found that the same claims were at issue in the Federal Case.

Id. at 1098-1099. Relying on this Court's decision in Ticor, claim preclusion bars
" ... adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to
'every other matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."' Id. at 1098
(citations omitted). Contrary to Stilwyn' s argument, the District Court had a basis for
determining the "same claims" are at issue. The District Court relied on this Court's broad
"transactional concept" defining a "claim" for claim preclusion. Id. Stilwyn merely cites to
Rule 13(a) and its argument there was no claim against it to compel a counterclaim to defeat this
conclusion. App. Br.14-15. However, the District Court already determined that Stilwyn was a
party due to its motion to intervene. R., Vol.V, p. 1096-1097. Along with the memorandum in
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support motion to intervene, Stilwyn filed an Answer in which it became an opposing party, a
defendant. R., Vol. III, p. 677-685, 774-782. The District Court properly moved forward with
its res judicata analysis by applying the broad transactional rule for claim preclusion to determine
that the same claims are at issue. R., Vol. V, p.1098-1099. Even though S tilywn still attempts to
characterize the Federal Case as a mere "declaratory judgment," the District Court held that:
It started that way in state court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC filed
a counterclaim. There was nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff from
litigating its claims. The action in federal court was not merely a declaratory
judgment or attachment case .... [Stilwyn] had the same opportunity to bring
claims as other parties.

Id. at 1099.
Third, the District Court held that "Stilwyn argues that there was no final judgment, that
they were a part of, in the Federal Case. However, the facts show otherwise." Id. at 1100. A
final judgment was entered in the Federal Case. Id. The Memorandum Decision and Order as
well as the stipulation for dismissal of the slander claim were " ... final judgments on the merits
which decided all issues brought or that could have been brought based on the facts arising out
the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction." Id. The District Court further held there were no material
issues of fact since Stilwyn was a party to the case and the judgment is final. Id. Stilwyn still
argues the Amended Judgment is "not effective" against it. App.Br. 36. Stilwyn focuses its
argument on a limited view of its party status rather than the District Court's application of the
rule in Ticor defining a final judgment expansively as " ... the former adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." R.,
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Vol.V, p. 1100; see also App.Br. 33-37. The District Court held then, that the "final judgment"
broadly includes claims that could have been brought based on the Stilwyn loan. R., Vol.V, p.
1100. Stilwyn does not dispute this definition of the "final judgment" but merely continues its
claim, as has been the focus of its brief, that it was not a "party" to which the Federal Case
Amended Judgment applies. App. Br. 34 (However, the District Court's conclusion may be true
for Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC). Stilwyn cannot select and choose when it is a "party"
once it was granted intervenor-defendant status.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A. The District Court did not err as a matter of law in its interpretation,
construction, and application of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion)
and its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's
involvement in the Federal Case
1. There arc no facts in dispute

The District Court found "no genuine issue as to any material fact exist[ ed]" and, as a
matter of law Stilwyn's claims were barred. R., Vol. V, P. 1096. Stilwyn acquiesces in this
assessment in its Appellate Brief, because nowhere in it does Stilwyn make any factual
argument. The District Court and IFB, refer solely to the record made in the Federal Case for the
factual basis for the legal arguments that Stilwyn was required to file compulsory counterclaims
in that action and, failing to do so, are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing
those claims in state court. Southern Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60
( 1962) ("The requirement that counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the opposing party's claim "shall" be stated in the pleadings was designed to prevent multiplicity
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of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common
matters.")
2. Stihvyn is a "Party" to the Federal Case, Without Limitation, Due to it
Being an Intervenor as a Matter of Right under Fed Rule 24(a)(2)

As an intervenor Stilwyn was a "party" to the Federal Case. An intervenor is treated
similarly as any other party. United States, et al. v. Board of Education of Waterbury, Conn.,
605 F.2d 573, 576 (2nd Circ. 1979)("An intervenor is certainly a party." (citations omitted));

Columbus-America Discovery Group, et al. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, et al., 974
F.2d 450,469 (4th Cir. 1992)("In general, intervenors of right 'assume the status of full
participants in a lawsuit and are normally treated as if they were original parties once
intervention is granted."') In the Federal Case, the Court granted Stilwyn status as an intervenor,
as a matter of right, with no limitation except to set filing deadlines for Stilwyn to submit its
pleadings.
3. Stilwyn fully participated as a "Party" in the Federal Case

Further, Stilwyn actively participated as a "party" to the federal proceeding. It moved to
intervene; it filed an Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment; and, it fully participated in
discovery filing written discovery and taking depositions. Stilwyn moved "to confirm its status
as a party counterclaimant with respect to the pending counterclaim for slander of title and for all
purposes of this litigation." The chronology of Stihvyn's participation in the Federal Case
demonstrates Stilwyn was an active player in the former litigation. The conduct indicates an
aggressive litigant.
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4. IFB has fulfilled its burden of proving the requirements to bar an action
based on claim preclusion: the parties are the same, the claims are the
same, and there was a final judgment

The requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action are: (1) same parties;
(2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d
613, 618 (2007) (citations omitted). IFB proved each of those elements in its motion for
summary judgment. The District Court agreed. R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1101.
5. The parties were the same

IFB argued and the Court agreed that, although Stilwyn tried to differentiate between the
parties to the Federal Case and those named in Stilwyn's Second Amended Complaint, the nonIFB parties were "significantly related to and intertwined" with Anaconda/Portfolio so as to be
the same parties in each case. Id. At 1097. The District Court found "there were no material
issues of fact as to whether the Federal Case and the state action have the same parties." Id.
6. The claims were the same

IFB extensively presented the operative facts involved in the Federal Case and the
subsequent procedural process of that case, arguing that the facts raised in Stilwyn's state case
arose from the same transactional basis. Stilwyn never directly addressed the "same claim"
argument. Instead it repeatedly argued since no claims were made against it, it was not required
to make any claims. Id. At 472-273. The District Court agreed with IFB that the claims in the
two actions were the same. Since Stilwyn never directly addressed the same claim argument, the

-30-

Court dispensed with Stilwyn's argument that it was not required to make any claims. It found
that
Plaintiff has two main arguments. One is that because there were no claims
against it, it did not have to file its claims as counterclaims. This analysis
contradicts the language of the rule and is not consistent with case law suggesting
that counterclaims need not be raised in certain actions. The Federal Case was not
merely a declaratory judgment or attachment case. It started that way in state
court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC filed a counterclaim. There was
nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff from litigating its claims. The federal
court action was not merely a declaratory judgment case, Stilwyn entered the case
as a party as a matter ofright. It had the same opportunity to bring claims as the
other parties. This is demonstrated by Stilwyn' s statements "confirming" its status
as a count-claimant joining the FDIC;s counterclaim. Stilwyn nevertheless argues
it never had its day in court or final judgment on the claims.
Reviewing the filings in the federal case, Stilwyn faild to assert the counterclaim
until late in the litigation. The opposition to allowing Stilwyn to join the FDIC's
counterclaim focused on the timeliness of raising the issue. Stilwyn then withdrew
the motion. The motion to join or confirm status in the FDIC was never denied.
After intervening, Stilwyn cannot simply pick and choose where and when to file
its claims. It chose to join the Federal Case, it assumed it had the ability to assert
the claim, it saw there was opposition and apparently tried to maneuver past the
opposition. The claim had to be raised there and then. It is even possible the court
would have allowed Stilwyn to pursue the counterclaim despite its untimeliness
under the scheduling order. Clearly the Federal Disctrict Court could get
jurisdiction over all paiiies and resolve all the claims. Stilwyn chose to join the
fray in the Federal Court and must live with the consequences.
R., Vol. V, p. 1098

99.

As a result of Stilwyn's failure to contest the same claims argument, the District Court
determined all claim should have been brought in the Federal Case.
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7. Final Judgment

In the Federal Case, both sides, the FDIC and Anaconda/Po1ifolio, moved for summary
judgment. Anaconda/Portfolio asked the court to rule that the rights in the Stilwyn Loan were
transferred from IFB to Anaconda when IFB and the FDIC entered into the Loan Sale
Agreement. Stilwynjoined the FDIC in asking the Federal Court to direct Anaconda and
Portfolio to release the Assignment and Lis Pendens. The Federal Court ruled that IFB never
obtained an interest in the Stilwyn Loan. As an assignor of IFB's rights in the Stilwyn loan,
Anaconda had no interest in the Stilwyn Loan and that the same was true for Portfolio. R., Vol.
IV, p. 798. The Court denied Anaconda's and Portfolio's Motion. The Court granted the
FDIC/Stilwyn Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
There was one remaining claim after the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The
FDIC had filed a counterclaim for slander of title against Anaconda and Portfolio not resolved by
summary judgment. Earlier, Stilwyn had moved to confirm its status as a party to the FDIC's
slander of title counterclaim. Id. At 851-53. Anaconda opposed the motion on the grounds,
inter alia, that Stilwyn had failed to plead that cause of action when it filed its Answer and that

the Motion was not timely, Stilwyn withdrew its Motion to Confirm Status. After the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order, Anaconda, Portfolio and the FDIC stipulated to a dismissal
with prejudice of the remaining claim for slander of title. On June 28, 2011, the Court entered a
Judgment (Id. At 888) and Amended Judgment (Id. At 889-890). The Amended Judgment
incorporated the slander of title stipulation that all claims, including slander of title, were
dismissed with prejudice.
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The Judgment and Amended Judgment in the Federal Case were final judgments on the
merits which decided all issues that were brought and/or could have been brought based on the
facts arising out of the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction. The District Court found that "there was
a final judgment in the Federal Case." R. Vol. V, p. 1100. All elements of claim preclusion
have been met.

8. This Court should not adopt the Declaratory Judgment Exception to Res
Judicata
Since the Federal Case did not begin and end simply as a declaratory judgment action, as
Stilwyn has argued, application of 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33 (1982), would not
resuscitate Stilwyn's claims. The cases cited by Stilwyn do not support its argument that the
declaratory judgment exception should apply. Instead the case law cited substantiates the
exception to the exception that if a declaratory judgment claim is filed with other requests for
relief, the exception does not apply. Thus, there is no basis for this Court to adopt Restatement
33 exception to res judicata in this particular appeal, and the District Court did not err in failing
to do so.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this Court recently summarized in Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc.,
Idaho_, 329 P.3d 356 (2014), the standard for appellate review ofan order granting summary
judgment
... is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." Thomas v. 1\;fedical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,
205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
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from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Oats v. Nissan
Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162,164,879 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court exercises free review over questions of law.
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130,132,233 P.3d 61, 63 (2010).
The application of claim preclusion is a question of law over which this Court exercises
free review. Kawai Farms v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,613,826 P.2d. 1322, 1325 (1992) and

Berkshire lnvs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80,278 P.3d 943,950 ( 2012) (" Whether an
action is bmred by res judicata is a question oflaw.")

ARGUMENT
A. Stilwyn was not a "Limited" Intervenor in the Federal Case

Stilwyn in its Appellate Brief attempts to downplay its role as an intervenor in the
Federal Case. App.Br. 4 ("Stilwyn sought leave to intervene to file briefing in support of the
FDIC's opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio motion." "Given the limited nature of its
intervention ... "). When Stilwyn moved to intervene in the Federal Case it did not move under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to enter the case in any "limited" capacity, it moved "for leave to intervene as
party defendant ... as a matter of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)." R., Vol. III, p. 673.
Once Stilwyn's motion to intervene was granted, it became a full-fledged "party" to the Federal
Case. Id. at 725-734. In United States v. Oregon, 675 F.2d. 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), the
Ninth Circuit characterized the status of intervenors as follows:
Intervenors under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), such as the Yakima Tribe, enter the suit
with the status of original parties and are fully bound by all future court orders.
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Marcaida v. Rascoe, 569 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1978); 7AC. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1920 (1972); 3B lvfoore 's Federal
Practice P 24.16(6), at 24-671 to 24-673 (2d ed. 1981). By successfully
intervening, a party "makes himself vulnerable to complete adjudication by the
federal court of the issues in litigation between the intervener and the adverse
party.
Id. at 24-671. See also, Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) ("When a party intervenes, it becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is treated
just as if it were an original party.") (Citations omitted.); and 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1901, at 257 (3d ed. 2007) (the purpose of intervention under Rule 24
is for the intervenor to "come in as a party" in its own right, not to support one side or another.)
Below, the District Court had no difficulty dispensing with Stilwyn's insistence it was not
a party in the Federal Case:
Here, the Plaintiff argues that he was not a party in the Federal Case. However,
Stilwyn filed a Motion to Intervene as a Defendant in the Federal Case, which
was granted. Memo. Decision and Order on Mot. to Intervene. While a party to
the Federal Case, Stilwyn complained that Anaconda and Portfolio, other parties
in the Federal Case against the FDIC, were wrongly claiming an interest in the
Stilwyn Loan. Mot. to Intervene at 2. Stilwyn claimed that they were a party of
right in the Federal Case, and the Court so ruled. Stilwyn was a party of right in
the federal case. By entering into the Federal Case, Stilwyn was a party for
purposes of res judicata.
R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1097.
Not only did Stilwyn become a "party of right" through the federal court decisions, as
found by the District Court, but Stilwyn, by its own acknowledgement, took the lead in pursuing
the slander of title claim. It represented to the Court in its Motion to Confinn Status as a Party to
Slander of Title Counterclaim, that it "ha[ d] actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under
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the slander of title claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, noticing and taking
depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 11, 2011." R., Vol. IV, p. 852.
To continue to argue that its intervention in the Federal Case was "limited" is, at best, a
mischaracterization of the level of its participation in pursuing the slander of title claim.
Stilwyn's flurry of activity in the Federal Case to prove the slander of title claim against
Anaconda/Portfolio and to seek damages on its own behalf, damages it claims were distinct from
the damages the FDIC was seeking completely negate any argument that Stilwyn's participation
was limited. The only basis for such a characterization might be that it ceased its activities after
Anaconda/Portfolio challenged its participation in the trial of the slander of title action because
Stilwyn had failed to timely plead a counterclaim on its own behalf and was trying to "piggy
back" onto the FDIC's counterclaim. R., Vol. V, p. 1094.
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that Res .Judicata barred Stilwyn's claims in
State Court
1. Stilwyn's slander of title and other tort claims were compulsory

counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and Stilwyn was required to file
them when it filed its Answer

In its "Summary of Argument on Appeal" and throughout the remainder of its Brief,
Stilwyn repeats the refrain "[b ]ecause no claims were made against it by Anaconda/Portfolio,
there was no 'opposing party' with a claim against Stilwyn that it was required to counter by the
compulsory counterclaim provisions of Rule 13(a)." App.Br. 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26
and 38. The District Court ruled otherwise.
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This analysis contradicts the language of the rule [13(a)] and is not consistent
with the case law suggesting that counterclaims need not be raised in certain
actions. The Federal Case was not merely a declaratory judgment or attachment
case. It started that way in state court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC
filed a counterclaim. There was nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff
[Appellant] from litigating its claims. The action in federal court was not merely a
declaratory judgment or attachment case. Stilwyn entered the case as a party of
right. It had the same opportunity to bring claims as the other parties. This is
demonstrated by Stilwyn's statements "confirming" its status as a counterclaimant joining in the FDIC's counterclaim."
R., Vol. V, p. 1099.
Stilwyn argues that "[t]he district court failed to appreciate the relationship and
authoritative significance ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to the application of res
judicata." App.Br. 9. It is readily apparent from the Court's analysis quoted above, that the Court
completely and fully understood the relationship between Rule 13( a) and res judicata.
2. Stilwyn's continuous argument that there were no claims against it so it is
not required to assert a counterclaim is still to no avail.

Stilwyn's persistent argument that since no claims were made against it, it was not
required to plead any counterclaim is contrary to the general rules of federal and state courts.
W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Failure to Assert Matter as Counterclaim as Precluding Assertion

Thereof in Subsequent Action, Under Federal Rules or Similar State Rules or Statutes, 22
A.L.R.2d. 621 ( 1952). The sh01i answer to Stilwyn' s first issue on appeal "Did the district court
commit reversible error as a matter of law in its interpretation, construction, and application of
I.R.C.P. 13(a), and its conclusion that Stilwyn was required to assert compulsory counterclaims
and third-party claims in the Federal Case?" is no. The District Court correctly ruled.
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Idaho Rule 13(a) and Federal Rule 13(a) are virtually identical. 10 They both mandate
filing a counterclaim arising out of the "transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim." Stilwyn's arguments address no aspect of the transaction or occurrence
requirement, but, extensively argues that Anaconda/P011folio "were not an 'opposing par1y' who
had first made claims against Stilwyn." App.Br. 20. To evade discussing the "arising out of the
transaction or occurrence" rule l 3(a) requirement for filing compulsory counterclaims is to
ignore the fundamental policies behind "the compulsory counterclaim rule of achieving
economy, fairness, and consistency by requiring both to be determined in a single suit." 3 James
Compare: I.C.R.P. 13(a). Compulsory counterclaims.
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the
claim if (I) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the
pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
10

With: Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Counterclaim and Crossclaim
(a) Compulsory Counterclaim.
(1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that--at the time of its
service--the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim:
(A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim; and
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
(2) Exceptions. The pleader need not state the claim if:
(A) when the action was commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action; or
(B) the opposing party sued on its claim by attachment or other process that did not establish
personal jurisdiction over the pleader on that claim, and the pleader does not assert any
counterclaim under this rule.
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Wm. Moore, et aL Moore's Federal Practice § 13 .10 (3d ed. 2010). By adopting the there-wasno-opposing-party argument, Stilwyn cannot dodge IFB's original argument that the Federal
Case and the state case arose out of the same transaction. R., Vol. II, p. 401-405. IFB' s
argument was adopted by the District Court:
The extent to which "claims" or "matter" are barred in later litigation has also
been addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. In Ticor, they state that"[c]!aim
preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat
the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should have been litigated
in the first suit."' The Idaho Supreme Court further stated that the "transactional
concept of a claim is broad" and that claim preclusion 'may apply even where
there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a
claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories.
R., Vol. V, p. 1098 (Citations and internal quotations omitted).
The District Court found that "the fact that Plaintiff never actually litigated its claims is
irrelevant. The question of claim preclusion turns on whether the claims could have and should
have been raised." Id.
3.

Stilwyn's reliance on Joseph v. Darrar, Kootenai Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Lamar
Corp and Noel v. Hall is misplaced.

Stilwyn relies on Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762, 472 P.2d 328 (1970) as authority for
the rule that "res judicata does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims and only actions
properly classified as Rule 13(a) counterclaims are barred by a failure to raise them in an earlier
action." App.Br. 9 & 20. Joseph, however, is of no assistance to Stilwyn. IFB argued and the
District Court found that the claims Stilwyn had, could have and should have raised in the
Federal Case were compulsory counterclaims. Joseph provides full support for that argument. It
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held that Rule 13(a) counterclaims were "'mandatory"' and were required '"to be pleaded and
adjudicated or else all right of action is foreclosed."' Joseph 93 Idaho at 765, 4 72 P .2d at 331.
But, at issue in Joseph was whether Rule 13(b ), permissive counterclaims, were barred by a
party's failure to raise them. The Supreme Court held:
It is our opinion that the res judicata principle is inapplicable to the litigation of
counterclaims. An action on a claim which was a permissive counterclaim in an
earlier action, but which was not raised and litigated in that action, is not barred
even though it might have been submitted and litigated in the earlier action. Only
actions on claims properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory
counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a) are barred by a failure to raise them in the
earlier action, and this is a bar arising not from the concept of res j udicata, but
from I.R.C.P. 13(a) itself. It is then, only compulsory counterclaims which are
barred either by a failure to raise them in the earlier action or by a decision on the
claim in the earlier action. An action on a claim which was the subject of a
permissive counterclaim in an earlier action is not barred by a failure to raise it in
the earlier action, but is only barred by a decision on the claim in the prior action.

Id. at 93 Idaho 766, 472 P.2d at 332. Joseph simply provides no authority or support for
Stilwyn 's argument.
Similarly, Stilwyn relies on the dissenting opinion in Kootenai Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Lamar

Corp., 148 Idaho 116,219 P.2d 440 (2009) to support its argument that since Stilwyn "did not
seek relief in the Federal Case and Anaconda/Portfolio sought no affirmative relief against
Stilwyn," Stilwyn was not required to file a compulsory counterclaim. App.Br. 24. Kootenai is of
little value to Stilwyn. That case addressed the "interplay between Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(g)
[permissive cross-claims] and the doctrine of res judicata." The majority agreed with the lower
court's analysis and found that"[ a] party need not bring a cross-claim that is permissive in nature
but when the party brings and pursues such a claim to a conclusion, res judicata applies." Id. 148
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Idaho at 122,219 P.2d at 446. Kootenai did not deal with compulsory counterclaims. Referring
to the majority opinion, Stilwyn presents the following non sequitur: "These facts and analysis
[from Kootenai] lend no support to the district court's decision here.'' App.Br. 23. The District
Court did not rely in any way on Kootenai, or even cite it.
Stilwyn does, however, rely on the dissent in Kootenai as "persuasive authority under the
facts here for reversal." Id. The dissent first noted that the claims at issue in the prior lawsuit
were between two defendants, KEC and Lamar, and therefore, would have been permissive
cross-claims under I.R.C.P. 13(g). Kootenai, 148 Idaho at 123,219 P.3d at 447. The dissent
reasoned that since the cross claim was a separate cause of action based on a statutory right to
indemnification it was a separate cause of action and clearly a permissive cross-claim. On that
basis, in the dissent' s opinion, it was not barred by res judicata. Id. A close reading of the
dissenting opinion in Kootenai does not lead to any conclusion that it is "persuasive authority"
for Stilwyn's proposition that since neither Stilwyn nor Anaconda/Portfolio sought affirmative
relief in the Federal Case, Stilwyn was not required to file compulsory Rule l 3(a) counterclaims.
Stilwyn challenges the District Court's dismissal of its case on the grounds that "Stilwyn
could have or should have brought claims against non-parties (IFB and the Rokan/Page
Defendants) in the Federal Case .... " Circuitously, Stilwyn argues "[t]here is no Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure or binding authority for the proposition that a 'non-party' to a prior suit qualifies
as an 'opposing party' within the meaning of Rule l 3(a)." App.Br. 26. This argument ignores
the District Court's discussion and ruling under the "l. Same Parties" analysis of the
Memorandum Decision. R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1097. There the District Court found, inter alia,
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that Stilwyn was a party to the Federal Case; the non-Idaho First Defendants were "significantly
related and intertwined with the two plaintiffs in the Federal Case - Anaconda and Portfolio";
and, that IFB was in privity with Anaconda." Id
Notwithstanding the District Court's ruling, Stilwyn attempted to stretch a factually
distinguishable and procedurally convoluted Ninth Circuit case, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9 th
Cir. 2003), into blanket authority for its "non-party/opposing party" argument. In Noel, the Ninth
Circuit used Washington State's claim preclusion rules to determine whether certain claims
should have been brought in several different prior state cases and were therefore precluded as
unasserted claims in federal court. The state cases involved a variety of parties in various
combinations. In one of the cases, a party had not been a plaintiff and "thus was not an opposing
party .... " Id at 1171. In applying Washington's Rule 13(a) requirements, the Ninth Circuit was
careful to note that "[t]he Washington courts have adopted a strict reading of Rule 13(a)'s
requirement that a pleader must bring compulsory counterclaims against 'any opposing party.'"
Id There is no authority that Idaho has followed Washington's or any other jurisdictions' "strict

reading requirement." Noel has no application to this case.
4.

Pursuant to Ruic 19, Stilwyn was required to join other parties to the
Federal Case.

In addition, Stilwyn's argument that it was not required to bring others into the Federal
Case, fails to account for the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, Required Joinder of Parties and
I.R.C.P. Rule 19( a)( 1), Persons to be joined if feasible. The parties which the District Court
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found Stilwyn could have or should have been joined were available under either Rule 19. All
parties were subject to the federal court jurisdiction and could have been made parties.
C. Adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Exception to Res Judicata would not
Alter the Result in this Case.

Stilwyn claims that, should this Court adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, the
foregoing analysis would change. Although the FDIC asserted a counterclaim for slander of
title, which was resolved by the U.S. District Court by a dismissal with prejudice, Stilwyn
continues to proclaim that "[t]he Federal Case started and ended as a declaratory judgment
action." App. Br. 28. Yet, regardless of Stilwyn's proclamation, the plain language of the
Restatement contradicts Stilwyn, as does the very case authority Stilwyn cites to this Court.
According to the Restatement, a final judgment in a declaratory judgment action is
"conclusive in a subsequent action between them as to matters declared," as well as "any issues
actually litigated by them and determined in this action." 1 Restatement (Second) Judgments§
33 (1982) (emphasis added). The slander of title counterclaim was litigated and determined in
the Federal Action. It was not "voluntarily dismissed" by the parties merely without prejudice.
Instead, pursuant to stipulation, it was dismissed with prejudice by Judgment entered by the U.S.
District Court. Such a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the
merits. See, e.g., Stewart, et al. v. US. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Circ. 2002), citing,

Paganis v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "with prejudice" is an
acceptable shorthand for "adjudication on the merits"); Classic Auto Refinishing, Inc. v. Marino

(In re Marino), 181 F .3d 114 2, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
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Federal Practice and Procedure § 23 73 ( 1973 ). Accordingly, the Federal Case did not start and

end as merely a declaratory judgment action, so application of the Restatement would not save
Stilwyn's claims.
The very first case cited by Stilwyn in support of its Restatement argument likewise
provides it with no support. Stilwyn cites this Court to Duane Read, Inc., v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 196 (2 nd Cir. 2010) for the general proposition that the preclusive

effect of a declaratory judgment action applies only to matters declared and to issues litigated
and determined, citing the Restatement. App. Br. 28. What Stilwyn leaves out is that the Second
Circuit also explained:
the declaratory judgment exception to the application of the doctrine of res
judicata applies when "the prior action involved only a request for declaratory
relief." Harborside [Refi"igerated Servs., Inc. v. Vogel], 959 F.2d at 372. See
also Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4446, at 313-14 ('So long as the request for declaratory relief is
combined or followed with coercive relief, the claim-preclusion rules that apply to
actions for coercive relief apply with full force.').
600 F.3d at 196 (emphasis in original). Applying this principle, the Second Circuit found:
Duane Reade argues that its claims come within the declaratory judgment
exception because the prior action was limited to a request for declaratory relief.
We disagree. In its initial action, Duane Reade brought two claims for
declaratory relief and two claims for breach of contract (which were later
dismissed without prejudice). St. Paul, in response, counterclaimed with its own
breach of contract claims, which the district court dismissed with prejudice. At
that point, the dispute was no longer only a request for declaratory relief.

Id.
Then applying Rule 13, the Second Circuit found that once counterclaims were "raised,"
the parties were then obligated to bring all the claims they had arising from the same transaction:
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When St. Paul raised its counterclaims, Duane Reade was compelled by Rule 13
to file its own claims arising out of the same transaction or occmTence or else be
precluded from pursuing those claims in a subsequent lawsuit. See Critical-Vac
Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int'/, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2000) ("If a
party has a compulsory counterclaim and fails to plead it, the claim cannot be
raised in a subsequent lawsuit."). The declaratory judgment exception does not
provide a safe haven from Rule I 3.
600 F.3d at 197. Finally, apropos of Stilwyn's dilemma in the current case, the Second Circuit
stated: "Where a litigant "selected a litigation strategy he now regrets, placing all his eggs in [a
single] basket[,] ... his choice of that strategy will not prevent the application of [preclusion
against him]." 600 F.3d at 199, quoting, In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1553
(11th Cir. 1995) (inserts in original).
Similarly, the further case authority Stilwyn cites contains the same caveat to the
declaratory judgment exception to res judicata. See, Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials
Corp., 512 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2008) (there is "an exception to the exception: a plaintiff who

joins his request for a declaratory judgment with a request for an injunction or damages cannot
avoid the bar of res judicata should he later seek additional such relief') (citation omitted);
Harborside Refrigerated Services, Inc. v. Vogel, supra, 959 F.2d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Many

jurisdictions recognize an exception to ordinary res judicata principles where, as here, the prior
action involved only a request for declaratory relief') (emphasis added); Cimasi v. Fenton, 838
F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988) ("where a party seeks declaratory relief as well as affirmative relief
through a coercive remedy, the exception under [the declaratory judgment exception to res
judicata] does not apply"); Horn & Hardart Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 843 F.2d
546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Where a party asks only for declaratory reliet: courts have limited
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the preclusive effect to the matters declared ... ") (emphasis added); Mandarino v. Pollard, 718
F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. Ill. 1983) ("Assuming, arguendo, that some controlling authority existed
for application of the declaratory judgment exception in this circuit, Mandarino's reliance on that
exception would still not aid him in this appeal. As stated in Restatement (Second) of Judgments

§ 33, comment c, the purpose of declaratory actions is to supplement other types of litigation by
providing 'a remedy that is simpler and less harsh than coercive relief.' According to the
Restatement, this purpose is furthered when a plaintiff who has sought 'solely' declaratory relief
is later permitted to seek additional, coercive relief based on the same claim. Under this
rationale, permitting Mandarino to proceed with his federal lawsuit would not further the purpose
of declaratory actions, since his state court action did not seek 'solely' declaratory relief').
Finally, Stilwyn cites to the canvass of other jurisdictions set forth in Andrew Robinson

Int'!, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (considering Massachusetts
law). In its discussion, however, the First Circuit again noted that the declaratory judgment
exception to res judicata is limited to situations where the original claim is limited solely to
declaratory relief:
We also have examined the leading treatises. In general, they subscribe to the
view that declaratory judgments should be accorded less preclusive effect than
other final judgments. The preeminent authority is the Second Restatement itself
. . . Other texts march to the same beat. See David L. Shapiro, Civil Procedure:
Preclusion in Civil Actions 63 (2001) ('[I]ssues not litigated in the declaratory
action -- perhaps because they were not foreseeable or because the plaintiff was
seeking only a limited clarification of his rights and duties -- should not be
foreclosed in a later coercive action arising out of the same controversy.'); see
also Rosemary Gregor et al., American Jurisprudence 2d Declaratory Judgments
§ 248 (2d ed. 2003) (similar); James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice§
131.24[3] (3d ed. 2008) (noting that public policy goals are 'furthered when a
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plaintiff who has sought solelv declarative relief is allowed to seek additional
coercive relief based on the same claim'); Charles A. Wright & Mary K. Kane,
Law o/Federal Courts 723-24 (6th ed. 2002) (similar). But cf 18A Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§
4446 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that 'traditional doctrine has refused to apply claim
preclusion to an action for declaratory relief alone,' yet criticizing that practice).
547 F.3d at 57 (emphasis added).
At the end of its discussion of the Restatement, Stilwyn again wishes the facts were
different than the actual are: "Anaconda/Portfolio sought a judicial determination of the legal
rights to the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan as against the FDIC. No other claims were made
and no other parties were included." App. Br. 31. This remarkable statement is unsupportable in
the record. Stilwyn made itself a party through intervention. The FDIC enlarged the scope of
the action through its counterclaim for slander of title. These facts prevent Stilwyn from
resurrecting its claims, even if this Court chose to adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments§
33.

IDAHO FIRST BANK'S ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL
A. The District Court erred in not awarding Idaho First Bank attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121
Because Stilwyn continued to pursue those claims which it could have or should have
brought in the earlier Federal Case, the District Court should have awarded Idaho First its full,
reasonable attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-121, together with Rule 54( e )( 1), empowers Courts to
award attorney fees in a case "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation."
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B. Idaho Code §12-121 Authorizes an Award of Attorney Fees To
Prevailing Parties.

Idaho follows the American rule when awarding attorney fees and costs. The American
rule is that "attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are authorized by statute or
contract." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401,
407,871 P.2d 818, 824 (1994). See Jesse R. Walters, A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in
Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 14 (2001) (discussing the underlying basis for attorney fee awards).

Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121 provides that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the
prevailing party or parties in any civil action. Although under I.C. § 12-121 "an award of
attorney fees is not a matter ofright to the prevailing party," a district court should make an
award when "'it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."' Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259
P.3d 608,615 (2011) citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001),
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580, 591(2009) (citing McGrew v. McGrew,

139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003)) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) (attorney fees "may be
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation .... ").
In this case, §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provide a concrete basis for an award of
attorney fees because Stilwyn's lawsuit was found to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
As noted above, the District Court summarily dispatched Stilwyn's arguments that it did not
have to file all of its claims as an intervener in the earlier Federal Case. "The Plaintiffs claims
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are barred by res judicata, specifically claim preclusion, because the claims should have been
brought in the Federal Case where Stilwyn voluntarily subjected itself to the jurisdictional
powers of the U.S. District Court for the District ofidaho as an intervener, could have asserted
the counterclaim, and did attempt to join the counterclaim with the FDIC." R., Vol. V, p. 1095.
The claims Stilwyn brought in this action no longer existed following entry of the judgment in
the Federal Case. The claims Stilwyn filed in this lawsuit were unfounded because they had no
basis in the law and were "inefficient and inappropriate to bring them in state court now," as the
District Court put it. Id. at 1098.
C. Idaho First Bank is the Prevailing Party.

Idaho First prevailed against Stilwyn. "A determination on prevailing parties is
committed to the discretion of the trial court. "Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating &

Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005). I.R.C. P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B)
guides court inquiries into the prevailing party question. It provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a part to an action prevailed in part and
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
attained.
"[T]he prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mde Ranch, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. The Court
in Eighteen Mile Ranch explained the value of a decision favorable to defendants as follows:
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Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that
a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation,
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more
exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear,
courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense.

Id See also Advanced Med Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. of Idaho. LLC, No. 39753-2012,
2013 Ida LEXIS 200, **7, (Idaho June 20, 2013), 303 P.3d 171, 174 (20 l 3)("Defendant was the
prevailing party in this litigation because Plaintiff's claim, which it lost, was the primary issue in
the litigation.") and Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Constr., LLC, No. 38202/38216, 2012
LEXIS 238, ** 13, (Idaho December 19, 2012), 294 P.3d 171, 176 (2012)(" In both Oakes 11 and

Eighteen Mile Ranch, this Court held that the district court abused its discretion by undervaluing
the successful defense of a claim or counterclaim and deciding that neither party prevailed
overall.")
Here, by avoiding all liability as a defendant, Idaho First obtained a result that is
equivalent to obtaining relief as a plaintiff. Idaho First is, therefore, the prevailing party on all of
the claims made by Stilwyn against Idaho First.
D. Stilwyn Unreasonably and Without Foundation Brought and Pursued its Claims
Against Idaho First Bank

Under Idaho law, once a defense of res judicata is blatantly apparent, further litigation is
frivolous, warranting an award of attorney fees. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d
502,509 (2003) citing Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,558, 768 P.2d 815,821 (Ct. App. 1989).
In Baldwin, a California jury awarded plaintiff damages and a judgment was entered in
11

Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, 152 Idaho 540,272 P.3d 512 (2012)
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California. On appeal the judgment was modified to allow post-judgment interest only from a
specific date. Plaintiff did not appeal that decision and defendant paid the amount of the
California judgment. Plaintiff then filed the original California judgment in Idaho, attempting to
recover post-judgment interest that had been disallowed by the California appellate court. The
Idaho trial court struck the filing of the California judgment and this Court affirmed the decision
and the award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e )(1 ). In upholding the lower
court's attorney fee award, the Court said:
Burns clearly knew that the foreign judgment which he filed in Idaho had been
modified and satisfied as a matter of law and that the issues that he raised would
be barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and res judicata. See Cole v.
Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 558, 768 P.2d 815, 821 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
once a defense of res judicata is blatantly apparent, further litigation is frivolous,
warranting an award of attorney fees). The district court exercised reason in
arriving at its award of attorney fees. The award of attorney fees was not an abuse
of discretion and is affirmed.

Burns, 138 Idaho at 487, 65 P.3d at 509.
More recently in Berkshire lnvs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012) this
Court found that under I.C. §12-123 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), the lower court was correct in
awarding attorney fees where the claim was pursued frivolously and was barred by a judgment in
a prior lawsuit. The Court found, "[t]he Mailes' suit before Judge Greenwood was simply an
attempt to relitigate an issue that had already been decided by this Court. It was also based on
identical facts as the action before Judge Wilper, so it was clearly barred by both issue and claim
preclusion." Id. at 86, 278 P.3d at 956. See Fibertection v. Jensen, No. CV-07-245, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44578 (D. Idaho May 28, 2009)("Where a party knows or should know that the
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defense of res judicata will bar its claim, further litigation is frivolous and warrants attorney fees
under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)".). Similarly, the Court in this case applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of issues already resolved by the courts in
Wyoming.)( citations omitted); Sw:face v. Commerce Bank of Hutchinson, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11638, *9 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 1990)("The decision to continue with litigation in this
indicating that plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The fact that the defendants were required to file a motion for summary judgment
based on collateral estoppel and res judicata is absurd."); Kahre-Richardes Family Found v.

Village of Baldwinsville, 953 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In their opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs continued to assert that res judicata did not
apply, despite clear precedent to the contrary. Therefore, in that Plaintiffs continued to litigate
after it became clear that their action was unreasonable and frivolous, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs are responsible for Defendants' attorney's fees.")
This lawsuit constituted a vexatious and calculated effort to re-litigate the issues decided
in the Federal Case. This was not a case presenting mixed issues oflaw and fact. Bonaparte v.

Neff, 116 Idaho 60, 64 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) ("The court in a case presenting mixed issues of
law and fact, must determine whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to establish a fairly
debatable issue under the legal theories advanced by the plaintiffs or whether the position
advanced was plainly fallacious.") citing rrench v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 751 P.2d 98 (1988)
and Associates Northwest v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1987). In dismissing
Stilwyn' s case, the District Court determined that "no genuine issue as to any material fact
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exist[ed]." R., Vol. V, p. 1096. The District Court found that Idaho First satisfied all three
prongs of the test for application of res judicata and that Stilwyn's State Court claims were
barred. Id. at 1101. The District Court rejected Stilwyn's claim that it was not a party to the
Federal Case and determined that the parties in the Federal Case and the State Case were the
same. Id. at 1097.
As to the second or "same claim" prong, the District Court found that Stilwyn failed to
bring or could have brought the same claims in the Federal Case that it raised in this case. The
District Court implied there was a degree of guile in Stilwyn's decision to abandon its Federal
Case claims, "[Stilwyn] chose to join the Federal Case, it assumed it had the ability to assert the
claim, it saw there was opposition and apparently tried to maneuver past the opposition." Id. at
1099. Stilwyn argued in opposition to Idaho First' s summary judgment motion, that there was
no final judgment in the Federal Case. This Court, however, ruled that the "judgments in the
Federal Case were final judgments on the merits which decided all issues brought or that could
have been brought. .. ."Id.at 1100.
Stilwyn pursued this lawsuit frivolously; the suit had no foundation in law or fact, and
had no merit because all the claims had been dismissed with prejudice in the Federal Case. This
is the quintessential case where attorney fees are appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-121 and
l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Stilwyn's claims were plainly fallacious and not fairly debatable, which is the
standard in Idaho. See Assocs. Nw, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.
App. 1987).
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In denying Idaho First' s request for attorney fees, the District Court indicated that there
were a "number of debatable issues and matters of first impression." R., Vol. V, p. 1301. As the
foregoing discussion on the applicability of res judicata doctrine suggests, Idaho First
respectfully submits that the District Court overstated just how debatable the issues raised were.
As its Memorandum Opinion itself indicates, the District Court had little difficulty in dispensing
with Stilwyn's futile objections to the operation of res judicata on its claims. Accordingly, the
District Court erred by not awarding Idaho First its reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.
12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l).

CONCLUSION
Idaho First Bank respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's entry of
summary judgment dismissing Stilwyn's claims against it, finding that Idaho First Bank has
proved all the required elements of claim preclusion and that Stilwyn failed to file its claims in
the Federal Case.
Idaho First Bank further respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's
denial of its motion for an award of attorney fees; that this Court find that Idaho First Bank was a
prevailing party under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); and, that Stilwyn pursued its
claims frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, including fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This g y of August, 2014.
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